

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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AMEMBASSY OSLO
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
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AMEMBASSY ROME

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EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM NATO MNUC GW
SUBJECT: ERW: ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS

REF: STATE 68555

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BEGIN SUMMARY. WE HAVE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE
BRITISH, PRESENTED THE FRG WITH THE PROPOSED
SCENARIO AND THE UK/US TEXT OF A PROPOSED LUNS STATEMENT.
THE GERMANS HAVE COME BACK WITH A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER
OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS BUT HAVE STRESSED REPEATEDLY THE
IMPORTANCE THAT THEY ATTACHED TO REACHING AN EARLY CON-
SENSUS. THE BRITISH HERE THINK IT MIGHT BE BEST TO

MOVE THE CONSULTATIONS TO NATO. WE THINK IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE TO HAVE ANOTHER ROUND HERE WITH THE FRG BEFORE THE MONDAY NAC MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTTEL INSTRUCTIONS, THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR TODAY GAVE RUTH OUR SUGGESTIONS ON THE ERW SCENARIO FOR NATO AS WELL AS THE UK DRAFT OF A LUNS STATEMENT (A DRAFT THE BRITISH MADE CLEAR HERE HAS ALREADY BEEN CHANGED TO MEET US WISHES). RUTH HAD EARLIER RECEIVED THE DRAFT FROM THE UK EMBASSY. THIS AFTERNOON, HE CALLED US AND UK REPS IN AND PRESENTED US WITH A REVISED TEXT (SEE BELOW) IN WHICH THE GERMANS PROPOSED A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF CHANGES.

BEGIN TEXT

A. AT THEIR MEETING TODAY, THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL CONCLUDED ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE US PROPOSAL TO PRODUCE ENHANCED RADIATION / REDUCED BLAST WARHEADS (E.R./R.B.WS).

THE NAC TAKES NOTE OF THE US DECISION TO PROCEED WITH THE PRODUCTION OF ERWS LOOKING TO THEIR DEPLOYMENT ON CERTAIN SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN ABOUT TWO YEARS.

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B. THE ALLIES ENDORSE THE US OFFER TO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT, IF THE SU IS PREPARED

(TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TANKS IN EUROPE IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A BALANCED TANK-RATIO IN EUROPE)
(TO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20 INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE).

IN VIEW OF EVIDENT SOVIET INTEREST IN LIMITATIONS ON ERW AND THE ALLIANCE'S CONCERN OVER

(THE EXISTING TANK DISPARITY)
(THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20)

THIS OFFER HOLDS OUT THE PROSPECT OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND ALLIANCE SECURITY.

C. THE NAC RECOGNIZED THAT, IN THE EVENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT ACCEPT THE US PROPOSAL, THE DEPLOYMENT OF E.R./R.B.WS IN EUROPE SHOULD PROCEED IN ABOUT TWO YEARS FROM NOW AS A NECESSARY FORM OF MODERNISATION OF NATO SHORT-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR

FORCES REQUIRED FOR STRICTLY DETERRENT AND DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

D. THE MODERNISATION OF SUCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS JUSTIFIED BY THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF SOVIET TANK STRENGTH.

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AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

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E. THE ALLIES REITERATED THE PRINCIPLE OF ALLIED DEFENCE POLICY TO ORIENT THEIR EFFORTS AT THEIR DEFENSIVE NEEDS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SU AND HER ALLIES. THEY NOTED THAT THE MILITARY

EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE SU AND HER ALLIES EXCEED
THE REQUIREMENTS OF A MILITARY POSTURE NEEDED FOR
DEFENSE. THE ALLIES REITERATED THEIR CONCERN WITH THE
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INCREASING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL
FORCES, IN PARTICULAR THE INCREASINGLY SUPERIOR NUMBER
OF TANKS, AND THE CONTINUED EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT
OF OFFENSIVE SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES, INCLUDING PARTI-
CULARLY THE SS-20 MISSILE, EACH OF WHICH CARRIES 3
WARHEADS VESTED WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF DEVASTATING
POWER.

F. THE ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE THEIR
ENDEAVOURS TO FIND, THROUGH MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL,
MEANS TO REMOVE THE SOURCES OF CONCERN TO THEIR SE-
CURITY IN EUROPE. THEY THEREFORE LOOK TO
THE SU TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE US PROPOSAL TO
FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF ERW'S IN EUROPE, IF THE SOVIET
UNION WILL

(REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TANKS IN EUROPE IN ORDER
TO ESTABLISH A BALANCED TANK RATIO IN EUROPE)

(FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20)

G. THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT EFFORTS
TO REACH A MORE STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE
THROUGH MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL. THEY LOOK TO THE
SOVIET UNION AND HER ALLIES TO JOIN IN ACHIEVING SUCH
MEASURES WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE DANGERS TO WESTERN
SECURITY AND THE SOURCES OF ANXIETY IN NATO-MEMBER
COUNTRIES REPRESENTED BY THE CONTINUING BUILD-UP OF
SOVIET ARMS IN EUROPE. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE ALLIES
NOTED THAT THEY CONTINUE TO CONSIDER

(THE EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT OF OFFENSIVE
SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES)

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(SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN TANKS)

TO CONSTITUTE A MAJOR THREAT TO SECURITY IN EUROPE.

END TEXT

2. RUTH SAID THAT THE CHANGES BEING PROPOSED BY THE FRG WERE OF THREE TYPES:

-- TO GIVE THE GERMAN TANK OPTION A SIMILAR WEIGHT IN THE INITIAL DISCUSSION AS THE US-UK SS-20 OPTION. HE ANTICIPATED THAT THE US WOULD USE THE OCCASION TO STRESS THE ADVANTAGES OF ITS OPTION AND THE FRG WOULD THEN STRESS THE ADVANTAGES OF THE TANK OPTION. HE SAID THE GERMANS BELIEVED IT WOULD BE SIMPLER AND PROCEDURALLY QUICKER TO HAVE THE ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE RIGHT IN THE PROPOSAL RATHER THAN FOR AMBASSADOR PAULS TO HAVE TO INTRODUCE THE CHANGES.

-- CHANGES THAT REFLECTED FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS BASED ON EARLIER US LANGUAGE.

-- CHANGES WHICH THE FRG THOUGHT IMPROVED OUR WORDING OR MIGHT ON OCCASION MAKE IT EASIER FOR OTHER ALLIES TO GO ALONG WITH THE LANGUAGE.

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3. GOING OVER HIS PROPOSED CHANGES IN DETAIL, RUTH
MADE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

-- SUBSTITUTING "THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL" FOR
"PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES" AND DROPPING THE PHRASE
"FOR DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE" MIGHT MAKE THE STATEMENT
EASIER FOR THE DUTCH TO ACCEPT.

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-- SUBSTITUTING "TAKES NOTE OF" FOR "SUPPORTS" AND
"LOOKING TO" FOR "WITH A VIEW T," AS WELL AS "IN
ABOUT TWO YEARS" FOR "WITHIN 18 TO 24 MONTHS" REFLECTS
THE FACT THAT THE MARCH 14 FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DECISION HAD ENDORSED THAT LANGUAGE ON THE BASIS OF
EARLIER US PRESENTATIONS. (WE ASSUME RUTH MEANS THE
TALKING POINTS PRESENTED ON THE BASIS OF STATE 61674
AND THE DISCUSSION PRESENTED AT NATO AND REPORTED IN
US NATO 2125.)

-- THE CHANGES IN PARAGRAPH B REFLECT THE FRG DESIRE
TO GIVE THE TANK OPTION EQUAL WEIGHT WITH THE SS-20
OPTION IN THE INITIAL PAPER. RUTH SAID HE RECOGNIZED
THE LACK OF SPECIFICITY IN THE FRG PROPOSAL BUT SAID
THAT US PROPOSALS FOR THE SS-20 WERE ALSO UNSPECIFIC.

-- IN PARAGRAPH C THE FRG PREFERS TO DROP THE PHRASE
"BY HALTING DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20 AND BEGINNING
SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS" BECAUSE THE US-UK LANGUAGE
SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIETS COULD STOP THE ERW DEPLOYMENT
SIMPLY BY LEAVING CURRENT SS-20S IN PLACE, AND IN FACT
EVEN BY CONTINUING TO BUILD THEM UP FOR ANOTHER TWO
YEARS AND THEN OFFERING TALKS, WHEREAS NATO'S PRUPOSE
IS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE TO FOREGO DEPLOY-
MENT OF THE SS-20 ALTOGETHER. SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS
MOTIVATE THE ADDITION OF THE PHRASE "IN ABOUT TWO YEARS
FROM NOW." THE DROPPING OF SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE
LANCE MISSILE AND THE 8 INCH HOWITZER IS EDITORIAL.

-- THE FRG WISHES TO HAVE THE SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH D

SEPARATE FROM PARAGRAPH C BECAUSE IT SHOULD STAND ON
ITS OWN MERIT RATHER THAN BE LINKED TO A NEGOTIATING
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SCENARIO.

-- THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES OF PARAGRAPH E REFLECT
POLITICAL AND CONCEPTUAL POINTS THAT THE FRG REGARDS
AS IMPORTANT. THE PHRASE "IN PARTICULAR THE INCREASING-
LY SUPERIOR NUMBER OF TANKS" WAS ADDED TO GIVE WEIGHT
TO THE GERMAN TANK OPTION, BUT ALSO STANDS ON ITS OWN
MERITS.

-- THE FRG PREFERS "VESTED WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF
DEVASTATING POWER" TO THE REFERENCE TO EUROPEAN CITIES
BECAUSE IT WOULD FORECLOSE THE SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT THE
SS-20 WOULD NOT BE AIMED AT CITIES.

-- THE CHANGES IN PARAGRAPH E REFLECT THE TANK ISSUE
AND ARE ALSO EDITORIAL. MOREOVER, THE FRG PREFERS NOT
TO USE THE PHRASE "MILITARY INSTABILITY" BECAUSE IT IS
UNCLEAR.

-- IN PARAGRAPH G, THE FRG WISHES TO ADD THE FIRST
SENTENCE TO INDICATE GENERAL ALLIANCE POLICY. OTHER
CHANGES ARE EDITORIAL OR REFLECT THE DESIRE TO GIVE THE
TANK OPTION EQUAL WEIGHT. IN THIS CASE, OF COURSE, THE
POINTS WOULD BE REVERSED: THUS, IF THE NAC WERE TO
DECIDE TO GO FOR THE SS-20 NEGOTIATING OPTION, THE
POINT TO BE MADE IN THE NATO STATEMENT WOULD BE THAT
NATO STILL REGARDS THE SOVIET TANKS AS A THREAT (OR
VICE VERSA).

-- THE FRG PREFERS TO DROP THE SENTENCE REFERRING TO
THE MBFR TALKS BECAUSE IT WISHES VERY STRICTLY TO
AVOID LINKING THIS MATTER WITH THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

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4. RUTH ASKED, BY WAY OF CLARIFICATION AND TO CHECK ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF LEAKS, WHETHER THE US PLANNED TO MAKE A PRODUCTION ANNOUNCEMENT SHORTLY AFTER A NAC CONSENSUS. THE BRITISH REP SAID IT WAS HIS INFORMATION THAT SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE VERY QUICKLY AFTER THE NAC CONSENSUS WAS REPORTED.

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5. AFTER RUTH HAD FINISHED HIS PRESENTATION, THE US POLITICAL COUNSELOR SAID HE WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH A NAC CONSENSUS OR EVEN TO REACH A TRIPARTITELY-AGREED DRAFT STATEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE GERMAN CHANGES THAT COULD PRODUCE DELAYS IN WORKING OUT. THE UK REP HAD SIMILAR CONCERNS, AND SAID THAT AMBASSADOR KILICK HAD ALREADY INDICATED THAT HE MIGHT ALSO HAVE SOME CHANGES TO MAKE. THEREFORE, HE SAID WE MIGHT FACE SOME LONG DRAFTING SESSIONS.

6. RUTH SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THESE CONCERNS. HE SAID

THE FRG WOULD STRIVE HARD TO MOVE TOWARD A CONSENSUS AND WOULD ACCEPT A CONSENSUS. HE SAID THE US COULD TABLE A PAPER AND EXPRESS PREFERENCES, AND THE FRG WOULD EXPRESS ITS PREFERENCES WHERE THEY DIFFERED (MOST PARTICULARLY, OF COURSE, ON THE TANK/SS-20 ISSUE). HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE THAT DIFFICULT TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT.

7. SPEAKING PRIVATELY TO US LATER, RUTH SAID IT WAS THE CLEAR GERMAN INTENT TO HAVE AN EITHER-OR DECISION ON THE TANK/SS-20 ISSUE. HE FULLY ACCEPTED THE POINT MADE IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF REFTTEL THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SHARPLY DEFINED NATO PROPOSAL. HE AGAIN REITERATED THAT THE FRG WAS DETERMINED TO WORK FOR AN EARLY CONSENSUS.

8. THE BRITISH OFFICIAL TOLD US AND RUTH THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD NOW BE NECESSARY TO GO TO BRUSSELS FOR NATO CONSULTATIONS, SINCE WE SEEMED UNABLE TO REACH TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. HE TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THE BRITISH MIGHT WANT TO CONSULT FURTHER IN LONDON AND
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WASHINGTON.

9. WE CONCUR WITH THE BRITISH SUGGESTION, SINCE IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO WORK OUT HERE ALL THE ISSUES BEFORE MONDAY. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE PRESSURES OF TIME, WE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER CONVERSATIONS WITH PAULS COULD INFLUENCE GERMAN VIEWS QUICKLY ENOUGH SINCE HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT BACK HERE. WE RECALL VAN WELL'S REQUEST (PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8 OF BONN'S 4660) THAT OUR DRAFT CONSENSUS STATEMENT FOLLOW THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR EARLIER PROPOSAL AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE, REFLECTING THE FACT THAT THIS LANGUAGE AND THE FRG IDEAS HAD BEEN CLEARED AT THE FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL LEVEL.

10. THEREFORE, IN THE INTEREST OF GAINING TIME AND OF HAVING SENIOR FRG CONSIDERATION AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOR US HERE AGAIN TO APPROACH THE FRG, PERHAPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH A US NATO APPROACH. WE COULD THEN INDICATE WHAT FRG SUG-

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GESTION WE COULD ACCEPT AND WHICH ONES WE COULD NOT
ACCEPT, AS WELL AS OUR FEELING ABOUT INCLUDING THE
TANK OPTION IN THE DRAFT US PAPER. BY MAKING THE
PARALLEL APPROACH HERE WE COULD PERHAPS INSURE
THAT PAULS' INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE.

11. AFTER THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED, POLITICAL DIRECTOR
BLECH CALLED THE CHARGE TO SAY THAT HE HAD REVIEWED
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THE MATTER DISCUSSED HERE TODAY AND HE WISHED TO MAKE
CLEAR THAT THE GERMANS REGARDED THE MARCH 20 MEETING AS
A "BRIDGE THEY HAD TO GET OVER" AND THAT HE HOPED
"THE US WOULD NOT PUSH THE BRIDGE TOO MUCH." HE INDI-
CATED THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO REACH CONSENSUS QUICKLY

IF OUR DIFFERENCES COULD BE RESOLVED "BY CAREFUL HANDLING" RATHER THAN BY ATTEMPTING TO COMPEL FULL FRG AGREEMENT WITH ALL ELEMENTS OF OUR POSITION. WHEN THE CHARGE OBSERVED THAT THE GERMAN CHANGES HAD LED TO A RATHER LONG BRIDGE AND THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW LONG THAT BRIDGE WOULD STAND, BLECH INDICATED HE DID NOT EXPECT IT TO STAND VERY LONG.

12. THE ABOVE REINFORCES OUR NOTION THAT SOME APPROACH OF THE KIND SUGGESTED ABOVE MIGHT HELP MOVE THE GERMANS MORE SWIFTLY.

13. N.B. ANY INSTRUCTIONS THAT WASHINGTON SENDS FROM SATURDAY A.M. ON WHICH IT WISHES US TO ACT THIS WEEK END SHOULD BE SENT BY NIACT IMMEDIATE.
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